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Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark†
By Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, and Jakob Egholt Søgaard*
Using Danish administrative data, we study the impacts of children 
on gender inequality in the labor market. The arrival of children 
creates a  long-run gender gap in earnings of around 20 percent 
driven by hours worked, participation, and wage rates. We identify 
mechanisms driving these “child penalties” in terms of occupa-
tion, sector, and firm choices. We find that the fraction of gen-
der inequality caused by child penalties has featured a dramatic 
increase over the last  three to  four decades. Finally, we show that 
child penalties are transmitted through generations, from parents 
to daughters, suggesting an influence of childhood environment on 
gender identity. (JEL D63, J13, J16, J22, J31, J71)
Despite considerable gender convergence over the last century, gender inequality in earnings and wage rates continues to be substantial in all countries, and the 
process of convergence has slowed down. The early literature on gender inequality 
in the labor market focused on the role of human capital and discrimination (Altonji 
and Blank 1999), but the disappearance of gender differences in education and the 
implementation of  anti-discrimination policies suggest that the explanation for the 
remaining gender gap lies elsewhere. Based on administrative data from Denmark, 
we provide a simple explanation for the persistence of gender inequality: the effects 
of children on the careers of women relative to men are large and have not fallen 
over time. As a result, almost all of the remaining gender inequality can be attributed 
to children.
To estimate the impact of children on the labor market trajectories of women 
relative to men, we adopt a  quasi-experimental approach based on event studies 
around the birth of the first child. For a range of labor market outcomes, we find 
large and sharp effects of children: women and men evolve in parallel until the birth 
of their first child, diverge sharply immediately after childbirth, and do not converge 
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again. Defining the “child penalty” as the percentage by which women fall behind 
men due to children, we find that the  long-run child penalty in earnings equals about 
20 percent over the period 1980–2013.1 This should be interpreted as a total penalty 
including the costs of children born after the first one, and we show that the penalty 
is increasing with the number of children. The earnings penalty can come from three 
margins—labor force participation, hours of work, and the wage rate—and we find 
sharp effects on all three margins that are roughly equal in size.
We also use the event study approach to shed light on a range of underlying 
mechanisms that may drive the earnings and wage rate impacts. We show that chil-
dren affect the job characteristics of women relative to men in a way that favor 
family amenities over pecuniary rewards. Specifically, just after the birth of the first 
child, women start falling behind men in terms of their occupational rank and their 
probability of becoming manager. Furthermore, women switch jobs to firms that 
are more “family friendly” proxied either by being in the public sector (which is 
known for its family friendliness) or by having women with young children in the 
management. The importance of the family friendliness of occupations and firms for 
gender equality has been much discussed in recent work (e.g., Goldin 2014, Goldin 
and Katz 2016), but here we provide clean event-study evidence that these qualita-
tive dimensions directly respond to the arrival of children.
Having estimated child penalties in the full population—allowing them to vary 
both across event time and across birth cohorts—we are able to decompose aggre-
gate gender inequality over time into  child-related inequality and residual inequality. 
We show that the fraction of total earnings inequality caused by child penalties has 
doubled over time, from about 40 percent in 1980 to about 80 percent in 2013. This 
dramatic change reflects a combination of two underlying changes: (i)  child-related 
gender inequality in earnings has increased from about 18 percent to 20 percent, 
and (ii) total gender inequality in earnings has fallen from about 46 percent to 
24  percent. To understand the first effect, note that although the child penalty in per-
centage terms has fallen slightly over time, the penalty operates on a larger base due 
to general increases in the earnings of women relative to men. While existing work 
points to the importance of parenthood for gender gaps, our decomposition analysis 
goes further by quantifying just how much of aggregate gender inequality is due to 
children and how this has evolved over time. The striking finding from this analysis 
is that over time gender inequality converges to the impact of children.
It is worth highlighting that our dynamic decomposition analysis represents a 
departure from standard gender-gap decompositions (see Blau and Kahn 2017 for 
a review) both in terms of the variation used for identification ( within-person vari-
ation as opposed to  cross-sectional variation) and in terms of the question asked. 
Standard decomposition approaches focus on the extent to which men and women 
receive unequal pay for equal work–the unexplained gender gap after controlling for 
human capital and labor market variables, but not children. By contrast, our goal is 
1 We use the term “child penalty” throughout the paper because it is a standard term in the literature. However, 
whether or not this should be viewed as a “penalty” on women depends on the underlying mechanisms driving it. 
For example, if the effect is driven by women voluntarily selecting into positions that have valuable family ameni-
ties (but lower wages), then the effect is not necessarily a penalty as such. We present evidence on such mechanisms 
as described below.
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to study the impact of children on gender inequality, not controlling for labor market 
variables (such as occupation and firm choices) that are transmission mechanisms 
for children. This is a conceptually different question: Even with perfectly equal pay 
for equal work—a zero gap in standard decompositions—our analysis would still 
show large  child-related gender inequality as equal work is in practice not an option 
for most women with children.2
Why are female child penalties so persistent after decades of effort to create gender 
equality through equal opportunity legislation, child care policies, and  job-protected 
parental leave? While fully answering this question is beyond the scope of our 
paper, we provide evidence on one possible explanation: child penalties are trans-
mitted through generations. We estimate the intergenerational transmission of child 
penalties by exploiting that our administrative measure of hours worked goes back 
to 1964, allowing us to relate the estimated child penalties between 1980–2013 to 
the  within-family work history one generation before. We find that female child 
penalties are strongly related to the labor supply history of the maternal grandpar-
ents, but not the paternal grandparents, even after controlling for a rich set of family 
characteristics. For example, in traditional families, where the mother works very 
little compared to the father, their daughter incurs a larger child penalty when she 
eventually becomes a mother herself. Our findings are consistent with an influence 
of nurture in the formation of women’s preferences over family and career. This 
analysis is related to the work by Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), but focusing 
on the intergenerational transmission of child penalties (as opposed to labor supply 
levels) between parents and their daughters (as opposed to  daughters-in-law). The 
analysis is also related to recent work on the importance of gender identity norms 
for labor market outcomes (Bertrand 2011; Bertrand, Pan, and Kamenica 2013). 
Our findings suggest that female gender identity is formed during a girl’s childhood 
based on the gender roles of her parents.
Our paper contributes primarily to two literatures. First and foremost, we contribute 
to the enormous literature on gender inequality in the labor market as reviewed by, 
for example, Altonji and Blank (1999), Bertrand (2011), Blau and Kahn (2017), and 
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016). Much of this literature has focused on the role of human 
capital, occupation, and discrimination in explaining gender gaps, but there is also a 
sizeable amount of work on the role of parenthood. This includes papers by Waldfogel 
(1998); Lundberg and Rose (2000);  Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007a, b); Correll, 
Benard, and Paik (2007); Paull (2008); Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010); Wilde, 
Batchelder, and Ellwood (2010);  Fernández-Kranz, Lacuesta, and  Rodríguez-Planas 
(2013); Fitzenberger, Sommerfeld, and  Steffes (2013); Goldin (2014); Adda, 
Dustmann, and Stevens (2017); Angelov, Johansson, and Lindahl (2016); and Goldin 
and Katz (2016). Our paper is most closely related to the case study of MBA graduates 
from Chicago Booth School of Business by Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010), and to 
the paper by Angelov, Johansson, and Lindahl (2016) who estimate child penalties in 
2 Our finding that child penalties represent an increasing share of gender inequality over time is consistent 
with the observation from standard  cross-sectional decomposition analyses that the unexplained part of the gen-
der gap has been increasing over time (see, e.g., Goldin 2014, Blau and Kahn 2017). A contribution of our event 
 study-based decomposition analysis is to show, in a causal sense, that the unequal effects of children are responsible 
for the increasing share of the unexplained gender gap.
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annual earnings and monthly wage rates using Swedish administrative data and an 
event study approach. Starting from related event studies, we contribute to the lit-
erature by providing evidence on mechanisms (the dynamics of occupation, sector, 
and firm choices), by investigating causal identification using different approaches, 
by developing a dynamic decomposition approach to estimating  long-run trends in 
 child-related gender inequality, and finally by studying the intergenerational trans-
mission of child penalties.
Second, we also contribute to the literature on children and family labor supply. This 
literature has focused on the potential endogeneity of children (e.g., Browning 1992), 
proposing instruments for the number of children, such as twin births (Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1980, Bronars and Grogger 1994) and sibling sex mix (Angrist and Evans 
1998). While our primary objective is to study gender inequality, our analysis also 
yields estimates of the impact of children on hours worked and labor force participa-
tion separately for males and females. Our event study approach relies on a different 
source of variation and captures a different impact than the existing  IV-approaches. As 
we clarify, the event study approach has the potential to capture the global treatment 
effect of all children in the population, as opposed to only the local treatment effect of 
a second child or a third child obtained from the twin or sibling sex mix instruments.3 
We provide two identification checks of the event study approach. First, we compare 
the local treatment effect of a third child based on a  sex-mix IV to the local treat-
ment effect of a third child that can be obtained from our event study approach. We 
show that the IV estimates and the event study estimates are almost perfectly aligned. 
Second, we provide a  difference-in-differences extension of our event study, using 
those who never have children as a control group. The  difference-in-differences event 
study produces impacts of children that are very similar to our baseline results.
Finally, we note that children may have two conceptually different effects on labor 
market outcomes. One is a  pre-child effect of anticipated fertility: women may invest 
less in education or select family-friendly career paths in anticipation of motherhood. 
The other is a  post-child effect of realized fertility: women changing their hours 
worked, occupation, sector, firm, etc., in response to actual motherhood. The event 
study approach cannot capture the  pre-child effect; it is designed to identify only the 
 post-child effect. If women invest less in education and career in anticipation of moth-
erhood, then our estimated child penalties represent lower bounds on the total lifetime 
impacts of children. The fact that these child penalties can account for most of the 
current gender inequality leaves relatively little room for  pre-child effects to operate 
today, but it is possible that such effects were more important at the beginning of 
the period we study.4 We provide descriptive evidence that, while the effect of child 
penalties on gender inequality has been growing over time, the effect of  pre-child 
human capital investments has fallen. This is consistent with a shift from  pre-effects 
3 We focus on the twin and  sex-mix instruments as these have been the most influential approaches, but other 
instruments have been proposed that might help uncover the effect of the first child as well. These instruments 
include miscarriages (Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders 2005), infertility shocks (Agüero and Marks 2008), and IVF 
treatment outcomes (Lundborg, Plug, and Rasmussen 2014).
4 In general, identifying anticipation effects of children is difficult without making strong structural assump-
tions, and we make no such attempt here. Taking a structural approach, Adda, Dustmann, and  Stevens (2017) 
estimates that occupational choices due to anticipated fertility represent a very small fraction of the total earnings 
loss from children.
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to  post-effects of children as a society develops: while women used to pay the career 
cost of children upfront, they now invest in education and careers almost at the level of 
men, but still end up paying the child penalty after motherhood.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the institutional background 
and data. Section II lays out the event study methodology and estimates the impacts 
of children. Section III presents our dynamic decomposition of gender inequality.
Section IV analyzes intergenerational transmission, and Section V concludes.
I. Institutional Background and Data
A. Institutional Background
Scandinavian countries have been praised for offering better opportunities for 
women to balance career and family than most other countries. This view is based 
on the presence of generous family policies— job-protected parental leave and pub-
lic provision of child care—and a perception that gender norms are comparatively 
egalitarian in Scandinavia. Consistent with this view, Denmark has one of the high-
est female labor force participation rates in the world, currently around 80 percent 
as opposed to around 70 percent in the United States, and it has almost no remaining 
gender gap in participation rates.
The perception of Scandinavia as being gender equal is not without merit, but 
two figures in the online Appendix give rise to pause. Online Appendix Figure A.I 
shows that the gender gap in earnings is still substantial in Scandinavian countries, 
and that it is no longer very different from the gender gap observed in the United 
States. That is, while gender inequality in Denmark used to be dramatically lower 
than in the United States, the gender pay gap is currently between 15–20 percent in 
both countries and appears to have stabilized at that level. Despite the presence of 
very different public policies and labor markets in these countries, their gender gaps 
are converging over time.
Online Appendix Figure A.II probes the idea that gender norms are more egali-
tarian in Scandinavia than elsewhere. The evidence presented is based on questions 
from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on the attitudes that people 
have toward market work by women with and without children. Two insights emerge 
from the figure. One is that gender attitudes are still quite  traditional— essentially 
that women should not be working  full time when they have children living at 
home—and the other is that different countries are very similar in holding this 
view. While the Scandinavian populations are somewhat more open to the idea 
that women with young children work part time (rather than staying at home 
entirely) compared to the United States, the similarities in gender attitudes stand 
out much more than the differences. Overall, the evidence in online Appendix 
Figures A.I– A. II raises doubts about the degree to which Scandinavian countries 
are strong outliers in terms of gender equality in the labor market.
The policy environment in Denmark is one that combines large  tax-transfer dis-
tortions (which may affect the gender gap due to differential labor supply elasticities 
between men and women) and generous family policies intended to support female 
labor supply. As shown by Kleven (2014), the effective tax rate on labor earnings 
186 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS OCTOBER 2019
is exceptionally large in Denmark, but so are the implicit subsidies to labor supply 
through publicly provided child care and public spending on other goods that are 
complementary to working (transportation, elder care, education, etc.). Over the 
period we consider, public child care is universally provided at a heavily subsidized 
price from around 6–12 months after birth. Until the child reaches the age where 
public child care becomes available, there is  job-protected and paid maternity and 
parental leave. Up until 2001, parents were offered 14 weeks of maternity leave 
followed by 10 weeks of parental leave to be shared between the mother and father. 
Since 2002, this has been extended to 18 weeks of maternity leave and 32 weeks of 
parental leave. Hence, throughout the period we consider, parents were covered first 
by paid leave and then by public child care, with no gap between the two.
B. Data
The analysis is based on administrative data for the full population in Denmark 
between 1980–2013. For the study of intergenerational transmission we exploit 
additional administrative data going back to 1964. The Danish data combine several 
administrative registers (linked at the individual level via personal identification 
numbers) and contain rich information on children, earnings, labor supply, occupa-
tion, firms, education, and many other variables. Crucially, the data allows us to link 
family members, generations, and workers with firms.
Our main event study analysis is based on first childbirths where the parents are 
observed every year between five years before having a child and ten years after. 
We are thus focusing on first childbirths between 1985–2003, where the parents are 
known, alive, and reside in Denmark throughout a  15-year window around the birth. 
We do not impose restrictions on the relationship status of the parents: we include 
all individuals who have a child in a given year and follow them through the  15-year 
window whether or not they are married, cohabiting, separated, divorced, or have 
not yet formed a couple in any given year. This leaves us with a core estimation 
sample of around 470,000 births or 15,040,000  individual-year observations.
We estimate child penalties in earnings, labor force participation, hours worked, 
and wage rates (earnings/hours worked for those who are working). Our ability to 
estimate child penalties in hours worked and wage rates using sharp event studies 
relies on a unique administrative and  third-party reported measure of hours worked 
that is available for the full population. This measure comes from a mandated pen-
sion scheme introduced in 1964—Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension (ATP)—that 
requires all employers to contribute on behalf of their employees based on individual 
hours worked.5 The pension contribution is a function of hours worked in discrete 
steps, namely four bins of weekly hours (0–8, 9–17, 18–26, 27–) for someone paid 
weekly or four bins of monthly hours (0–38, 39–77, 78–116, 117–) for someone 
paid monthly, with the latter being much more common. Hence, the annual pension 
contribution for someone paid monthly depends on  ∑ i=1 
12  h i , where monthly hours 
h i has 4 steps (corresponding to the lower bound of each interval), which gives an 
5 The scheme also covers  self-employed individuals who contribute on their own behalf.
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annual hours measure in 37 steps (= 4  × 12 − 12 + 1). Our measure of the wage 
rate is defined as earnings divided by this ATP hours measure.
Because the ATP hours measure is capped, it does not capture marginal hours 
adjustments for those working every month of the year in the highest hours bin. 
For a given child penalty in earnings, this will make us underestimate the penalty 
in hours worked and correspondingly overestimate the penalty in wage rates. The 
hours measure does capture larger labor supply adjustments such as switches to 
different levels of  part-time work and work interruptions within the year, which are 
important adjustments for women with children. The key advantage of our measure 
is that it is precisely measured for the full population over a very long time period, 
unlike labor market surveys that have considerable measurement error and small 
samples.
II. Impacts of Children
A. Event Study Methodology
The ideal experiment for studying the impact of children would be to random-
ize fertility. Absent such an experiment, researchers have proposed instruments for 
the number of children such as twin births (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, Bronars 
and Grogger 1994) and sibling sex mix (Angrist and Evans 1998). Such instruments 
can provide insights on the local effect of a second child or a third child, but they cannot 
provide estimates of the total effect of children—and in particular of the first child—in 
the population. This limits the usefulness of such approaches for our agenda, which 
is to understand the implications of parenthood for gender inequality. To investigate 
this question, we adopt an event study approach based on sharp changes around the 
birth of the first child for mothers relative to fathers. Although fertility choices are not 
exogenous, the event of having a first child generates sharp changes in labor market 
outcomes that are arguably orthogonal to unobserved determinants of those outcomes 
as they should evolve smoothly over time. The event study approach has the additional 
advantages of tracing out the full dynamic trajectory of the effects, and of being very 
precise, as it exploits  individual-level variation in the timing of first births. We spell 
out the identification assumptions of our approach in online Appendix B.
For each parent in the data, we denote the year in which the individual has his/her 
first child by  t = 0 , and index all years relative to that year. Our baseline specification 
considers a balanced panel of parents who we observe every year between 5 years 
before having their first child and 10 years after, and so event time  t runs from −5 to 
+10. To investigate the very long run, we also present results for a sample of parents 
who we observe up to 20 years after the birth of their first child. We study the evolution 
of a wide set of labor market outcomes as a function of event time. Specifically, denot-
ing by  Y ist 
g
 the outcome of interest for individual  i of gender  g in year  s and at event 
time  t , we run the following regression separately for men and women:
(1)  Y ist 
g
 =  ∑ 
j≠−1
  α j 
g
 ⋅ 𝐈 [ j = t] +  ∑ 
k
  β k 
g ⋅ 𝐈 [k =  age is ] +  ∑ 
y
  γ y 
g ⋅ 𝐈 [y = s] +  ν ist 
g
 , 
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where we include a full set of event time dummies (first term on the  right-hand side), 
age dummies (second term), and year dummies (third term). We omit the event time 
dummy at  t = − 1 , implying that the event time coefficients measure the impact of 
children relative to the year just before the first childbirth. If we did not include age 
and year dummies, the estimated event coefficients  α ˆ t 
g would correspond simply to the 
mean value of the outcome at event time  t , relative to the year before birth. By includ-
ing a full set of age dummies, we control  nonparametrically for underlying  life-cycle 
trends, and by including a full set of year dummies, we control  nonparametrically 
for time trends such as wage inflation and business cycles. We are able to identify 
the effects of all three sets of dummies because, conditional on age and year, there is 
variation in event time driven by variation in the age at which individuals have their 
first child. The inclusion of age dummies is important for comparing men and women 
because women tend to be younger than men when having their first child.
We specify equation (1) in levels rather than in logs to be able to keep the 
zeros in the data (due to  nonparticipation). We convert the estimated level 
effects into percentages by calculating  P t 
g ≡  α ˆ t 
g / E[ Y ̃ist 
g
 ∣ t ], where  Y ̃ist 
g
 is the pre-
dicted outcome when omitting the contribution of the event dummies, i.e., 
 Y ̃ist 
g
 ≡  ∑ k  β ˆ k 
g
 ⋅ 𝐈 [k =  age is ] +  ∑ y  γ ˆ y 
g ⋅ 𝐈 [y = s] . Hence,  P t 
g captures the year- 
t effect of children as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome absent chil-
dren. Estimating percentage effects based on a  level-specification (rather than a 
 log-specification) may raise the concern that the estimates are mainly driven by the 
effects at the top of the distribution, especially when considering earnings as the 
outcome. We will present quantile regressions of (1) that rule out this concern.
Having estimated the impacts of children on women and men separately, we 
define a child penalty on women relative to men at event time  t as
(2)  P t ≡  
 α ˆ t 
m −  α ˆ t 
w 
 _________
E [ Y ̃ist w ∣ t] 
 . 
This child penalty measures the percentage by which women are falling behind men 
due to children at event time  t . Two points are worth noting about this measure. First, 
while the identification of  short-term child penalties (say  P 0 or  P 1 ) rely primarily on 
a smoothness assumption common to all event studies, the identification of  long-term 
penalties (say  P 10 or  P 20 ) requires stronger assumptions and may call for the use of a 
control group (such as men and women who do not have children) or an instrument. 
We verify our event study estimates using these alternative strategies later. Second, 
while our approach is based on the event of having the first child,  long-run child pen-
alties will include the impact of children born after the first one, unless of course we 
condition the sample on having only one child in total. Hence,  long-run child penalties 
have the potential to capture the total effect of children on gender inequality.
B. Estimating the Impacts of Children
In this section, we present estimates of the impacts of children on the trajectory 
of a wide range of labor market outcomes for men and women. We start by showing 
impacts on earnings, labor supply, and wage rates, and then turn to the underlying 
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anatomy of these impacts by showing how occupation, firm, and sector choices by 
men and women respond to children.
Impacts on Earnings, Labor Supply, and Wage Rates.—Figure 1 plots the 
 gender-specific impacts of children  P t 
m ,  P t 
w across event time. As defined above, 
these are outcomes at event time  t relative to the year before the first childbirth 
( t = − 1 ), having controlled  nonparametrically for age and time trends. The figure 
includes 95 percent confidence bands around the event coefficients, although these 
are not always clearly visible due to the high precision of our data. Panel A starts by 
showing total earnings before taxes and transfers. We see that, once  life-cycle and 
time trends are taken out, the earnings of men and women evolve in an almost par-
allel fashion until parenthood. But at the precise moment the first child arrives, the 
earnings paths of men and women diverge: women experience an immediate drop 
in gross earnings of almost 30 percent, while men experience no visible change in 
their earnings. In the years following the initial drop, the earnings of women never 
converge back to their original level. Ten years after the birth of a first child, female 
earnings have stabilized at around 20 percent below its level just before childbirth, 
whereas male earnings are essentially unaffected by children. As shown in the fig-
ure, the child penalty in the earnings of women relative to men is equal to 19.4 per-
cent after 10 years.
These earnings impacts can come from three margins: hours worked, labor force 
participation, and the wage rate. Panels  B–D of Figure 1 show that all three margins 
are in play. For each of these outcomes, the trajectories of men and women are almost 
exactly parallel prior to having children and then diverge sharply immediately after 
the arrival of the first child. The gaps that open up in labor supply and wage rates are 
driven entirely by negative impacts on women, while men are unaffected.6 For all 
outcomes, the gender gaps are very stable from around event time three, and women 
show no sign of labor market recovery ten years after the first child. Interestingly, 
the estimated  long-run penalties in hours, participation, and wage rates are similar in 
magnitude, implying that these margins are roughly equally important for the earn-
ings impacts.7 While our primary goal in this paper is to understand gender inequal-
ity, we note that the event studies of working hours and participation contribute to 
the large literature on family labor supply and fertility by providing clean estimates 
of the labor supply implications of the first child.
Our baseline specification shows that the impact of children is persistent over a 
 ten-year horizon, but it is of course interesting to study the impact over an even lon-
ger horizon. Hence, Figure 2 considers an event study horizon that includes 20 years 
after the birth of the first child. For this exercise, we expand from the balanced panel 
of parents who have their first child between  1985–2003 to an unbalanced panel of 
6 Our measures of hours worked and wage rates are conditional on labor force participation. The estimated 
effects in panels B and D, therefore, include any selection effects into participation. If, as traditional selection mod-
els would predict, workers are positively selected on wage rates, then the true magnitude of the negative impact of 
children on female wage rates would be larger than implied by our estimates.
7 The child penalties in panels  B–D of Figure 1 are unconditional penalties: when estimating the effect of par-
enthood on one particular margin, we are not controlling for the other two margins in the regression. This explains 
why the  long-run penalties on the three margins do not sum up to the overall earnings penalty. 
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parents who have their first child at any time between  1970–2013. In this sample, 
we estimate  cohort-specific event coefficients and show average coefficients for the 
birth cohorts  1985–2003. The figure shows how strikingly persistent the effects of 
children are. In fact, the earnings impact 20 years after childbirth is almost the same 
as the impact 10 years after. The only qualitative difference that emerges in the very 
long run is that hours worked do eventually begin to converge, while at the same 
time wage rates keep diverging. The combination of the narrowing hours gap and 
the widening wage rate gap produces a constant earnings gap.
We provide a number of extensions and robustness checks in the online Appendix. 
First, while our event study approach uses the birth of the first child, the evidence 
presented so far is based on the full population of parents, irrespective of the total 
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Figure 1. Impacts of Children
Notes: The figure shows event time coefficients estimated from equation (1) as a percentage of the counterfactual 
outcome, absent children (i.e.,  P t 
g ≡  α ˆ t 
g / E [ Y ̃ist 
g
 ∣ t] as defined in Section IIA) for men and women separately and 
for different outcomes. Each panel also reports a “child penalty”—the percentage by which women are  falling 
behind men due to children—defined as  P t ≡  ( α ˆ t 
m −  α ˆ t 
w ) /E [ Y ̃ist w ∣ t] . The  long-run child penalty is measured at 
event time 10. All of these statistics are estimated on a balanced sample of parents who have their first child between 
 1985–2003 and who are observed in the data during the entire period between five years before and ten years after 
child birth. The effects on earnings and participation are estimated unconditional on employment status, while the 
effects on hours worked and wage rates are estimated conditional on participation. The shaded 95 percent confi-
dence intervals are based on robust standard errors.
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 number of children they end up having. This implies that the dynamic patterns 
include the effects of children born after the first one, and the estimated  long-run 
impacts should be interpreted as capturing the total impact of all children. To explore 
the implications of multiple children, online Appendix Figure A.III replicates the 
event study in earnings in subsamples that condition on total fertility (1, 2, 3, or 
4 children). The impact of children is very sharp in all four family types, and the 
 long-run child penalty increases by  7–10 percentage points per child. The  short-run 
impact of the first child is about the same across families with 1, 2, or 3 children (a 
gender gap of  25–30 percent at event times 0 and 1), and only gradually do the dif-
ferent family sizes diverge as more children arrive in the larger families. In families 
with four children, on the other hand, the impact is larger from the outset, suggesting 
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Figure 2. Impacts of Children in the Very Long Run
Notes: This figure is constructed in the same way as Figure 1, but expanding the event time window to include 20 
years after the birth of the first child. In order to do this, we expand from the previously balanced panel of par-
ents who have their first child between  1985–2003 to a unbalanced panel of parents who have their first child at 
any time after 1970, and who are observed in the data for the maximum years allowed by our data window. On 
this sample, we estimate  cohort-specific event dummies similar to the specification in equation (3) and compute 
 P t 
g ≡  α ˆ t 
g / E [ Y ̃ist 
g
 ∣ t] similar to Figure 1, using the average estimated event coefficients for the birth cohorts 
 1985–2003. The  long-run child penalty is measured at event time 20. The shaded 95 percent confidence intervals 
are based on robust standard errors.
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that these families anticipate that they will have many children and divide gender 
roles immediately after the first one.8
Second, in the event graphs presented so far, the drop in earnings and labor sup-
ply in year zero is not much larger than the drop in subsequent years. This may seem 
surprising given the extra time taken off for maternity leave immediately following 
delivery. However, note that the use of  calendar-year measures of earnings and labor 
supply create attenuation bias in the initial dip: as women give birth during year 
zero, some of the earnings and hours in this year were realized prior to childbirth. 
To investigate this point, online Appendix Figure A.IV reproduces the event study 
on a sample restricted to January births, in which case calendar time and event time 
coincide. Here, we do see a pronounced dip in event year zero as one would expect.9
Finally, the fact that we estimate percentage effects based on a  level-specification 
(rather than a  log-specification) implies that the estimates put more weight at the 
top of the distribution. If there is lots of heterogeneity in the impacts of children 
across the distribution, the mean impacts can be very different from the impacts 
further down the distribution. To address this concern, online Appendix Figure A.V 
shows median impacts of children on earnings and total hours worked. These quan-
tile regressions are based on a 1/7 subsample, which makes the confidence bands 
somewhat larger. The results in the figure show that the median impacts are roughly 
similar to mean impacts, ruling out the concern that our results are representative 
mainly of the top of the distribution.
Impacts on Occupation, Sector, and Firm.—We have seen that motherhood is 
associated with large and persistent effects on earnings driven in roughly equal pro-
portions by participation, hours of work, and wage rates. These empirical patterns, 
and especially the large wage rate effects, beg the question of what are the underly-
ing mechanisms? One possibility is that women, once they become mothers, make 
career choices in qualitative dimensions (occupations, sectors, firms, etc.) that favor 
family amenities over pecuniary rewards. The importance of such effects has been 
much discussed (see e.g., Goldin 2014), and there is plenty of  cross-sectional evi-
dence showing that women with children work in different occupations and indus-
tries than women without children or men. Still, we are not aware of any evidence 
that these qualitative dimensions directly respond to children. We provide such evi-
dence in this section.
The results are presented in Figure 3, which is based on the same specification 
as above. Panel A considers occupational rank in five levels: unskilled labor, skilled 
labor,  white-collar work (low level),  white-collar work (high level), and top man-
ager. This ordering of occupations is consistent with an ordering based on average 
earnings or average wage rates in each occupation. This panel shows that men and 
women are on identical trends in terms of their occupational rank prior to becoming 
8 Note that the event study graph for families with two children in panel B of online Figure A.III looks very 
similar to the graph for all families in Figure 1. This is natural given that the average completed fertility, conditional 
on having children, is close to two in Denmark.
9 Focusing on January births also reveal a small drop in labor market outcomes in event year −1, which can be 
explained by sick leave and maternity leave during pregnancy. In Denmark, women are eligible for maternity leave 
during the last four to eight weeks of pregnancy.
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parents, but that women start falling behind men soon after parenthood.10 Note that 
the occupation graphs for men and women begin to diverge in event year one rather 
than in event year zero. This is natural given that women are giving birth during year 
zero, so that this year consists partly of a  pre-birth period and partly of a period cov-
ered by  job-protected parental leave. Hence, women do not have a strong incentive 
10 Notice that the impact of children is identified from the sharp changes in outcomes immediately following 
childbirth (for women relative to men) rather than from the smooth trends in outcomes. In panel A, there is a smooth 
downward trend in occupational rank for both men and women. Because we control for age and year fixed effects, 
these trends reflect that individuals who have children earlier in life tend to have lower occupational rank. This is a 
 cross-sectional correlation in the data, not an effect of having kids.
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Figure 3.  Anatomy of Child Impacts
Notes: The figure shows impacts of children on men and women  P t 
m ,  P t 
w , as well as the  long-run child penalty 
 P t (at event time 10) as defined in Section IIA. The effects on occupational rank are estimated conditional on not 
being  self-employed or an assisting spouse. The effects on the probability of having a female manager with chil-
dren below 15 is estimated conditional on being in a firm with at least 10 employees. The graphs in panels C and D 
take into account differential  pre-trends between men and women. The shaded 95 percent confidence intervals are 
based on robust standard errors.
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to change occupation within year zero, but can wait until year one when they return 
to work.
Panel B also explores occupational rank, but focuses specifically on the proba-
bility of becoming manager. We see a clear and persistent drop in the female prob-
ability of being manager after parenthood, while there is no change in the male 
probability of being manager around parenthood. In the long run, the probability of 
rising to the manager level is reduced by 26 percent for women relative to men as a 
result of having children.
The bottom panels turn to the choice of work environment and, in particular, 
its family friendliness.11 We first consider the link between children and the deci-
sion to work in the Danish public sector, which has a long tradition of focusing 
on working conditions rather than on wages. This includes flexible working hours, 
leave days when having sick children, and a favorable view on long parental leaves 
(see Nielsen, Simonsen, and Verner 2004 for a detailed description). It is therefore 
natural to expect that mothers would be induced to move into the public sector, a 
hypothesis that is confirmed in panel C. The probabilities of working in the public 
sector for men and women begin to diverge soon after having a child. As with occu-
pation, the divergence starts in year one rather than in year zero, i.e., when women 
return to work after their parental leave. We estimate that, 10 years after childbirth, 
women are 12 percent more likely than men to work in the public sector as a result 
of parenthood.
Finally, panel D considers a proxy for the family friendliness of a work envi-
ronment that also encompasses heterogeneity across firms in the private sector. 
Specifically, we proxy family friendliness based on whether the firm’s management 
includes women with young children (below 15 years of age). The advantage of 
this measure is that it can capture many aspects of an otherwise complex, multidi-
mensional concept. Having women with young children in management may reflect 
generous maternity leave schemes, tolerance toward sick days, flexible working 
hours, the possibility of working from home, etc. Because firms that have women 
with young children in management tend to offer lower wage rates, if women move 
into such firms following motherhood, this helps explain the wage rate penalties 
documented above.
The figure provides strong evidence that the family friendliness of women’s work 
environment responds to motherhood. The male and female probabilities of work-
ing in a  family-friendly firm are almost perfectly parallel until the arrival of the 
first child, but they start diverging shortly after childbirth. This effect is driven by 
mothers switching firms as opposed to  within-firm increases in family friendliness: 
we find no effect on family friendliness when conditioning on staying in the same 
11 The specification underlying these panels departs from the baseline specification used so far. When consider-
ing sector and firm choices, there is a difference in  pre-trends between men and women, even after controlling for 
age and year dummies. As these (smooth)  pre-trends distracts from the breaks around parenthood, panels C and D 
control for linear  pre-trends. That is, we estimate a linear trend separately for men and women using only  pre-event 
data, and then we run the main event study specification residualizing the outcome variable with the estimated 
 pre-trend.
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firm over time. The  long-run effect of children on the probability of working in a 
 family-friendly firm for women relative to men is equal to 8 percent.12
Identification.—Based on event studies around the birth of the first child, we 
have argued that women’s career trajectories (but not men’s) are causally affected 
by children in a range of quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Before moving to 
the next step of the analysis, we pause to consider the causal identification of these 
impacts. Specifically, while the identification of  short-run effects in an event study 
design relies only on smoothness and is therefore relatively compelling, the identi-
fication of  long-run effects requires stronger assumptions. Implicitly, our estimates 
of  long-run child penalties are based on using men as controls for women. The 
presence of parallel  pre-trends after controlling  nonparametrically for lifecycle and 
time trends lends support to this assumption, but as we move further away from the 
event those  pre-trends become less informative. Furthermore, it may be problematic 
to use men as a control group given that they are also treated by the event, even if 
the smoothness of male outcomes around childbirth suggests that in practice they 
are unaffected.
In online Appendix B, we lay out a conceptual framework for identification and 
provide two identification checks that we briefly discuss here. The first identifi-
cation check is a  difference-in-differences (DD) event study design in which we 
compare those who have children to those who never have children. This design is 
based on assigning placebo births to individuals who never have children, drawing 
from the observed distribution of age at first child among those who do have chil-
dren. The technical details are described in online Appendix B.2 and the results are 
shown in Figure A.VI. Panel A shows earnings impacts for women, while panel B 
shows earnings impacts for men. Women with and without children are on identical 
 pre-trends, diverge sharply at the time of the first childbirth, and the impact is very 
stable over time. The  long-run impact of children equals 20.6 percent, slightly larger 
than the baseline impact of 19.4 percent shown in panel A of Figure 1. A new insight 
that emerges from the DD event study is that men are affected by parenthood. The 
effect is tiny (3 percent after 10 years), but the high precision of our data makes 
it very clear. The small effect on men implies that the earning impact on women 
relative to men—as captured by the child penalties obtained from the baseline 
specification—is slightly smaller that what we reported in Figure 1.
The second identification check compares our event study approach to an IV 
approach using the sex mix of the first two children as an instrument for having a 
third child (as first proposed by Angrist and Evans 1998). Given the sibling sex mix 
instrument can be used only to estimate the local average treatment effect of a third 
child, we compare it to an event study around the birth of a third child. As a result, 
12 While we have thus shown that switching to more  family-friendly firms in the private or public sectors is one 
of the mechanisms driving the child penalty in earnings, a related question is whether being in a  family-friendly firm 
prior to childbirth serves to moderate the child penalty. In other words, what is the pattern of heterogeneity in pen-
alties with respect to  pre-parenthood firm and sector decisions? An earlier version of the paper included a detailed 
heterogeneity analysis, which showed that having a more  family-friendly employer by the time of childbirth is 
indeed associated with a significantly smaller penalty. This holds even after including rich controls for other factors 
that are correlated with firm and sector choices.
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this analysis does not provide a direct validation of our child penalty estimates, but 
rather an indirect validation of the event study approach. The details of the design are 
described in online Appendix B.3 and the results are presented in Figure A.VII. The 
conclusion from this analysis is that the event-study estimates and the IV estimates 
are almost perfectly aligned, providing strong support for our empirical approach.
These robustness checks strongly suggest that the impacts of children can be 
causally identified based on  within-person variation in an event study design. This is 
useful for future research in this area.
III. Decomposing Gender Inequality over Time
A. Dynamic Decomposition Framework
In this section, we decompose gender inequality into what can be attributed to 
children and what can be attributed to other factors, showing how this composi-
tion has evolved over time. We take a standard  Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
approach, but innovate on existing gender gap decompositions by leveraging the 
event study variation around childbirth. In particular, while standard decomposition 
approaches in the gender literature (see e.g., Blau and Kahn 2017) have been based 
on  cross-sectional variation in education and labor market variables not including 
children, our decomposition approach focuses precisely on children and exploits 
 within-person variation over time. The goals of these two decomposition exercises 
are different: while the traditional goal has been to estimate the wage gap between 
observationally equivalent males and females—the unexplained gap sometimes 
interpreted as “discrimination,” although it could also reflect children—our goal is 
to delve into the unexplained part of traditional decomposition analysis by estimat-
ing the impact of children. The impact we estimate could operate through both the 
unexplained and explained parts of standard  cross-sectional decomposition analyses 
because those analyses include variables such as occupation, industry, and experi-
ence, which represent some of the mechanisms responsible for the impact of chil-
dren as we have seen above.
Two points are worth highlighting from the outset. First, provided that the child pen-
alties are correctly identified (as argued above), our decomposition into  child-related 
gender inequality and residual gender inequality should be viewed as causal rather 
than purely correlational. Second, since child penalties by construction capture only 
the  post-effects of actual fertility and not the  pre-effects of anticipated fertility, resid-
ual gender inequality includes the potential  pre-effects of children. For example, edu-
cation choices made prior to having children may reflect anticipated fertility.
We focus on gender inequality in earnings. To capture changes over time in the 
impact of children on gender inequality, we extend the baseline specification (1) 
to allow for  year-specific coefficients on event time. Specifically, we consider the 
following specification:
(3)  Y ist 
g
 =  ∑ 
y
  ∑ 
j≠−1
  α yj 
g
 ⋅ 𝐈 [ j = t] ⋅ 𝐈 [y = s] +  ∑ 
k
  β k 
g
 X kis 
g
 +  ν ist 
g
 , 
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where we interact the event time dummies with year dummies in order to estimate 
 year-specific event coefficients  α yj 
g
 . Note that estimating event coefficients by calen-
dar year  s and event year  t amounts to estimating event coefficients by birth cohort 
c = s − t . The second term on the  right-hand side includes covariates indexed by  k 
that may vary across individuals  i and calendar time  s . As in our baseline specifica-
tion (1), we begin by including a full set of age dummies and year dummies in the 
set of covariates, but we will also consider an extended specification that includes 
a rich set of education dummies. Importantly, the  X s should not include any earn-
ings determinants that directly respond to the event of childbirth as such covariates 
would bias the estimated event coefficients. That is, while it may be legitimate to 
control for education choices made prior to having children, controlling for factors 
such as occupation and firm choices (which we have seen respond to childbirth) 
would lead to bias.
Defining the mean gender gap in year  s as  Δ s ≡  {E [ Y ist m | s] − E [ Y ist w | s] } /E [ Y ist m | s] 
 and using specification (3), we can rearrange terms so as to obtain
(4)  Δ ˆ s =   
E [ P st  Y ̃ist w | s] 
 ________
E [ Y ˆist m | s] 
 
⏟child penalties
 +  
 ∑ k  ( β ˆ  k m −  β ˆ  k w ) E [ X kis m | s] 
  ________________
E [ Y ˆ ist m | s] 
 

 
different returns to Xs
 +  
 ∑ k  β ˆ  k 
w {E [ X kis m | s] − E [ X kis w | s] } 
  ____________________ 
E [ Y ˆ  ist m | s] 
 

differences in Xs
 ,
where  P st ≡  ( α ˆ st 
m −  α ˆ st 
w
) /E [ Y ̃ist w | s, t] is the child penalty at event time  t in calendar 
year  s ,  Y ̃ist 
w is the predicted counterfactual earnings (i.e., absent children) for women, 
and  Y ˆ  ist 
m is the predicted actual earnings for men. The first term on the  right-hand 
side captures the impact of child penalties on gender inequality, the second term 
captures the impact of different coefficients on  non-child covariates (such as differ-
ent returns to education), while the last term captures the impact of differences in 
 non-child covariates (such as different levels of education). In the standard language 
of decomposition analysis (see e.g., Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 2011), the first two 
terms represent “unexplained” effects (different regression coefficients), while the 
last term represents “explained effects” (different observables).13
To decompose gender inequality over the full period  1980–2013, we expand 
from the previously balanced panel of parents who have their first child between 
 1985–2003 to the full population of parents who have their first child between 
 1970–2013. For first childbirths after 1980, we observe parents for at least one year 
prior to childbirth and are therefore able to estimate child penalties relative to event 
time −1, as we have done so far. Moreover, because we keep parents in the sample 
for the longest possible number of years (for example, parents who have their first 
child in 1981 are observed until event time  t = 32 , conditional on still being alive 
13 For simplification purposes, equation (3) does not include an explained effect of differences in children 
between men and women. We leave out this term in the equation (but not in the analysis) because it is always very 
close to zero. In fact, in a balanced panel of men and women who have children together, the fractions of men and 
women at each event time in each calendar year are, by construction, the same. As we describe below, our decom-
position analysis is based on an unbalanced panel, and so the explained effect of children will be  nonzero, resulting 
from differential attrition of men and women due to deaths and migration. However, the explained effect of children 
due to such differential attrition is, in practice, tiny.
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and residing in Denmark), we are able to estimate child penalties at all event times 
for the  post-1980 birth cohorts. On the other hand, for first childbirths up until 1980, 
we observe only  post-event years and are therefore unable to directly estimate child 
penalties associated with these births. For these birth cohorts, we therefore rely on 
an extrapolation of the  post-1980 penalties that we describe below. The reason we 
include the earlier cohorts in the estimation sample when running specification (3) 
is that they help estimating the effect of the  non-child covariates (such as education).
In Figure 4, we show earnings penalties by birth cohort obtained from speci-
fication (3). Panel A focuses on  short-run penalties (event times  0–10) and panel 
B focuses on  long-run penalties (event times  11–20). Each panel includes a linear 
OLS fit in order to highlight the trend. We see that there is no trend in the  short-run 
penalties, but a linear downward trend in the  long-run penalties. We use these esti-
mated trends to extrapolate child penalties to earlier birth cohorts: penalties between 
event times  0–10 are assumed to be constant at the average level of the later cohorts, 
while penalties between event times  11–20 are assumed to follow the linear trend 
estimated for the later cohorts.14 With these extrapolations, we obtain estimates of 
the child penalty  P st for every event time and every year between  1980–2013, allow-
ing us to decompose gender inequality into  child-related inequality and  non-child 
inequality over the full period.
14 For event times beyond 20 for the earlier cohorts, we assume that the penalty stays constant at its level in 
event time 20. Such a steady-state assumption can be justified by the results presented in Figure 2, panel A, which 
showed that earnings penalties are quite stable from around event time 10.
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Figure 4. Earnings Penalties by Birth Cohort and Extrapolation
Notes: The figure shows earnings penalties by birth cohort obtained from equation (3). Panel A shows the average 
penalty across event times  0–10, while panel B shows the average penalty across event times  11–20. Each panel 
also includes a linear OLS fit. There is a 0 trend in the  0–10 year penalty, while there is a linear downward trend 
in the  11–20 year penalty. We use these linear trends to extrapolate child penalties to birth cohorts prior to 1981.
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Figure 5. Decomposing Gender Inequality in Earnings
Notes: The figure shows dynamic  Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions based on equations (3) and (4). The decompo-
sition shown in panel A allows for  year-specific,  event-time coefficients and control for a full set of age and year 
dummies. The decomposition in panel B augments the specification with education dummies: primary school, sec-
ondary school, vocational training, short  post-secondary school, bachelor’s degree, and master’s/PhD degrees. In 
both panels, the  child-related gender gap captures the effect of child penalties  P st (the “unexplained” effect of chil-
dren). In panel B, the  education-related gender gap includes both the effect of different education levels (explained 
effect) and the effect of different education coefficients (unexplained effect). The residual gender gap represents the 
effects (explained and unexplained) of age and year dummies.
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B. Decomposition Results
The results of our decomposition analysis are shown in Figure 5. Panel A is based 
on the specification without education controls, and it shows  child-related gender 
inequality in blue and residual gender inequality in grey. We see that the fraction of 
gender inequality that can be attributed to children has increased dramatically over 
time, from about 40 percent in 1980 to about 80 percent in 2013. This increase reflects 
a combination of two underlying changes: (i)  child-related gender inequality in earn-
ings has increased from 18 percent to almost 20 percent, and (ii) total gender inequal-
ity in earnings has fallen from 46 percent to 24 percent. To understand the first effect, 
note that although the percentage child penalty has fallen slightly over time, the pen-
alty operates on a larger base due to the general increase in the earnings of women 
relative to men coming from the second effect. As shown in equation (4), the impact 
of children on gender inequality depends both on the size of child penalties and on 
the counterfactual earnings of women relative to men. Hence, during a period where 
 non-child gender inequality is falling and child penalties are constant or falling by 
less, there will be a tendency for  child-related gender inequality to go up.15,16
Our findings imply that, to a first approximation, the gender inequality that remains 
today is all about children. The fact that our approach misses the potential  pre-effects 
of anticipated fertility only reinforces the conclusion that gender inequality is now all 
about children, but it could change the conclusion that this was not the case  30–40 
years ago. It is conceivable that, while the impact of child penalties ( post-effects) has 
increased over time, the importance of  pre-effects has fallen. Indeed, it would be nat-
ural if women invested less in education and careers in anticipation of motherhood in 
a more traditional era. In other words, the pattern documented in panel A may reflect 
a gradual shift away from  pre-effects toward  post-effects of children.
To provide suggestive evidence on this idea, we include education choices made 
prior to childbirth in the specification. Specifically, we include dummies for pri-
mary school, secondary school, vocational training, short  post-secondary school, 
bachelor’s degree, and master’s/PhD degrees. The results are presented in panel B, 
which shows  child-related gender inequality in blue and  education-related gender 
inequality in orange. The  education-related part includes both the effect of different 
education levels (explained effect) and the effect of different education coefficients/
returns (unexplained effect), with the latter being quantitatively more important. 
The explained effect of education is small from the start and turns negative in the 
15 Besides these  long-run changes in the composition of gender inequality, Figure 5 shows a  short-run busi-
ness cycle effect: during recessions (early 1980s, early 1990s, and  2008–2009) overall gender inequality falls, but 
 child-related inequality does not, and so the fraction of gender inequality due to children increases. In fact, during 
the global financial crisis in  2008–2009, we estimate that  child-related gender inequality was more than 90 percent 
of total inequality.
16 To understand how the increasing importance of children plays out over the  life cycle, online Appendix Figure 
A.VIII decomposes the age profiles of gender inequality in earnings for two specific years: 1985 and 2013. We see 
that there is relatively little earnings inequality in the tails: before having children and around the age of retirement. 
The largest earnings inequality occurs among those aged  30–55, around the time where most families have children 
living at home, and this is also where we estimate the impact of children—the difference between the dashed grey 
and solid grey lines in the figure—to be largest. While in 1985 there is a large difference between male earnings 
and counterfactual female earnings (i.e., absent children) throughout the  life cycle, in 2013 there is only a small 
difference between male earnings and counterfactual female earnings throughout the  life cycle.
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early 2000s as women overtake men in terms of education levels. This is consis-
tent with the disappearance of the college gap in the United States (Goldin, Katz, 
and Kuziemko 2006) and in most other high- and  middle-income countries (Kleven 
and  Landais 2017). As for the unexplained effect of education, this absorbs the 
effect of men and women choosing different education fields, conditional on level. 
In particular, women tend to choose “softer” fields than men (such as health care and 
teaching as opposed to construction and engineering) that are not as highly remuner-
ated, but may offer better family amenities.
Two main insights emerge from panel B. First, the inclusion of education controls 
has only a small impact on the estimation of  child-related gender inequality. It is 
still the case that  child-related inequality is close to 80 percent of total inequality 
at the end of the period. The robustness of the decomposition analysis to education 
controls results from the event study variation we use: the child effect is identi-
fied from  within-person time variation around childbirth, while the education effect 
is obtained from  cross-sectional variation and therefore does not absorb the child 
effect. Of course, the fact that the education effect is based on  cross-sectional vari-
ation implies that, unlike the child effect, it is only correlational. Second, while the 
 child-related gender gap has been growing over time, the  education-related gender 
gap has been shrinking dramatically.  Education-related inequality was almost as 
large as  child-related inequality at the beginning of the period, but has almost dis-
appeared over time. Our findings are consistent with a secular shift in the relative 
importance of  post-effects of children (child penalties) and  pre-effects of children 
(as proxied by education choices).
In this section, we have tried to  reorient the traditional focus of gender gap 
decompositions by considering the impact of children and by exploiting sharp time 
variation instead of  cross-sectional variation. Rather than studying the extent to 
which men and women receive unequal pay for equal work (the unexplained gap 
after controlling for human capital and job characteristics), we show that men and 
women receive unequal pay largely because of the unequal distribution of child care 
responsibilities. Even with perfectly equal pay for equal work, there would still be 
large gender inequality in earnings as equal work is not an option for the majority of 
women who are faced with the lion’s share of child care responsibilities.
IV. Intergenerational Transmission of Child Penalties
A. Background
Why are female child penalties so large and persistent? Traditional economic 
explanations appeal to comparative advantage in infant child care and the gains from 
specialization. However, the fact that the unequal effects of children persist over 
the entire career path of parents—and considering that women are now more edu-
cated than men on average—suggests that there is more going on than just compar-
ative advantage.17 A potential explanation is the presence of gendered preferences 
17 In fact, Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2018) shows that there is essentially no heterogeneity in child penalties 
with respect to the relative education levels of the parents; women at the top of the relative education  distribution 
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or norms regarding the appropriate roles of women and men who have children. 
Indeed, we saw in online Appendix Figure A.II that the views on gender roles in 
families with children remain conservative in all countries. This raises the question 
of where these gendered preferences are coming from? In this section we present 
evidence that child penalties are transmitted through generations—from parents to 
their  daughters—consistent with an influence of nurture in the formation of female 
preferences over family and career.
Our analysis relates to the literature studying the importance of gender identity 
norms in the labor market, as reviewed by Bertrand (2011). Many have argued that 
gender identity is formed during childhood, and some papers have documented the 
existence of intergenerational correlations in gender identity norms and female labor 
supply. Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) finds that the labor force participation 
of married women is positively correlated with the labor force participation of their 
husbands’ mothers, but not with the labor force participation of their own mothers, 
after controlling for various  socioeconomic characteristics. Their interpretation is that 
men growing up with working mothers develop more modern gender role attitudes 
and therefore have stronger preferences for working wives. Related, Farré and Vella 
(2013) show that mothers’ gender role attitudes are correlated with their children’s 
attitudes and labor force participation. They also find such correlations between 
mothers and  daughters-in-law, similar to Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004).
Our analysis diverges from previous studies in two respects . First, we consider 
the intergenerational transmission of child penalties—i.e., labor supply changes 
around childbirth for women relative to men—rather than the intergenerational 
transmission of labor supply levels. Working with child penalties takes care of 
some of the omitted variable concerns encountered when working with labor supply 
levels. Our analysis relies on our ability to link three generations—children, their 
 parents, and their maternal and paternal grandparents—in the Danish administrative 
data. Second, we demonstrate the existence of a link between child penalties and the 
maternal grandparents, but not the paternal grandparents, in contrast to the earlier 
findings discussed above. Our findings are consistent with the idea that women’s 
preferences over family and career are shaped by the gender roles she is exposed to 
during her childhood.
B. Specification
The analysis is based on our baseline event study sample of men and women who 
have their first child between  1985–2003 and are observed in a  15-year window 
around the first childbirth. To link the child penalties for these parents to the past 
labor market behavior of the grandparents, we exploit that our administrative ATP 
measure of hours worked goes back to 1964. This allows us to investigate the rela-
tionship between child penalties for the  1985–2003 births and the relative labor sup-
ply of grandmothers and grandfathers during  1964–1979, distinguishing between 
maternal and paternal grandparents.
incur about the same penalty as women at the bottom of the distribution. This is not the empirical pattern one would 
expect if the comparative advantage channel were very strong.
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Denoting the cumulated labor supplies between  1964–1979 of the maternal 
grandmother and grandfather by  h i 
mm and  h i 
mf
 , we rank parents by quantiles of the 
distribution of  h i 
mm −  h i 
mf
 . For the paternal grandparents, we similarly rank parents 
by quantiles of the distribution of  h i 
pm
 −  h i 
pf
 . A higher rank in these distributions 
implies that the grandparents were more “modern” in terms of their gender division 
of labor.
We estimate how child penalties vary by these grandparental rank measures. 
Because here we are not primarily interested in the exact dynamic path of child 
penalties, we adopt a more parsimonious specification that replaces the full set of 
event time dummies for  t = − 5,  … , 10 by a single dummy for being at positive 
event times  t ≥ 0 . In other words, we are considering average child penalties over 
the  10-year period following childbirth. To estimate the effect of the maternal grand-
parents, we consider specifications of the following type:
(5)  Y ist 
g
 =  ∑ 
q
  α q 
g · 𝐈 [ after t ] · 𝐈 [ grand iq 
m
] +  ∑ 
k
  β k 
g · 𝐈 [k =  age is ] +  ∑ 
y
  γ y 
g · 𝐈 [y = s] 
 +  ∑ 
q
  ζ q 
g · 𝐈 [ grand iq 
m
] +  δ 
g ·  X i 
m +  η g · 𝐈 [ after t ] ·  X i 
m +  ν ist 
g
 , 
where  𝐈 [ after t ] is an indicator for  t ≥ 0 ,  𝐈 [ grand iq 
m
] is an indicator for the maternal 
grandparents being in quantile  q of the distribution of relative labor supply, and  X i 
m 
is a vector of controls for the maternal grandparents that we describe below. In the 
richest specification we allow the impacts of these controls to vary before and after 
childbirth. As before, we run the specification in levels and calculate the percentage 
impact of children on women as  P q 
w ≡  α ˆ q 
w / E[ Y ̃is 
w] in the  q th quantile of the relative 
labor supply distribution of the maternal grandparents.18 The specification for the 
paternal grandparents is the same, only replacing  m by  p .
To ensure that the intergenerational correlation in child penalties is not just a 
transmission of other variables that are correlated with child penalties, we include 
the following controls for the characteristics of the grandparents (maternal and 
paternal, respectively). First, we include education dummies for both the grand-
mother and the grandfather capturing the length and the field of education. The 
length of education is divided into primary school, secondary school, vocational 
training, short  post-secondary school, bachelor’s degree, and master’s/PhD degrees. 
Above secondary school, each level is divided into different fields such that we end 
up with 22 education dummies for each of the grandparents. These controls ensure 
that the intergenerational correlation in child penalties does not reflect a transmis-
sion of educational preferences or ability. Second, we control for the wealth level 
of the grandparents. We use the average net wealth of the grandfather over the years 
 1980–1990 and control for quantiles of the  within-cohort wealth rank of the grand-
father.19 This ensures that the child penalties are not driven by wealth effects that are 
18 Our analysis of intergenerational correlations focuses on the impact of children on women,  P q 
w . We do not find 
any intergenerational correlations when considering the impact on men,  P q 
m .
19 This administrative wealth measure is available for the universe of Danish taxpayers as it was collected for 
the purpose of a wealth tax that existed until 1996.
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transmitted through generations. Finally, we include dummies for the birth cohort 
of both the grandmother and the grandfather, as well as dummies for the region of 
residence of the grandparents.
C. Results
Our first results are presented in Figure 6. This figure plots the child penalty in 
earnings against quintiles of the relative labor supply distribution of the maternal 
grandparents (panel A) and the paternal grandparents (panel B). In this figure, we 
are not including the grandparental controls described above (education levels, edu-
cation fields, wealth levels, and region of residence).20
Panel A of the figure shows a clear  downward-sloping relationship between the 
female child penalty and the relative labor supply of the maternal grandmother. That 
is, women incur smaller earnings penalties from children if they themselves grew 
up in a family where the mother worked more relative to the father. The effect of 
going from the bottom quintile to the top quintile of the distribution is quite large, 
6 percentage points, or almost  one-third of the total penalty. In contrast, panel B of 
the figure shows no effect of the paternal grandparents: the relationship between 
the female child penalty and the relative labor supply of the paternal grandparents 
is essentially flat, except for a small effect at the very top. The differential pattern 
between maternal and paternal grandparents suggests that child penalties are driven 
partly by female preferences formed during her childhood, rather than by male pref-
erences formed during his childhood.
20 However, we do include  cohort dummies for the grandparents as it seems more reasonable to consider the 
impact of grandparental labor supplies conditional on the norm for their cohort.
Figure 6. Intergenerational Transmission of Child Penalties without Controls
Notes: The figure shows the child penalty in earnings against quintiles of the relative labor supply distribution of 
the grandparents. The relative labor supply of grandparents is based on cumulated hours worked over the period 
 1964–1979 (obtained from ATP pension contributions). The child penalties are estimated using equation (5) and the 
statistic reported is  P q , as defined in Section VB. The panels only include controls for the birth cohort of the grand-
parents. The shaded 95 percent confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors.
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The obvious concern with interpreting these correlations is that they may reflect 
heterogeneity in other correlated dimensions. What appears to be a transmission 
of labor supply behavior from parents to daughters may be a transmission of 
other variables that are correlated with labor supply. To investigate this concern, 
Figure 7 shows intergenerational correlations when we control for other factors 
that are transmitted across generations and impact labor supply: dummies for the 
education level and field of each grandparent, dummies for the wealth quantile of 
the grandparents, and dummies for the region and cohort of the grandparents. In 
the figure, we allow the wealth, region, and cohort variables—but not the educa-
tion variables—to have differential effects before and after childbirth. We see that 
the results are hardly affected by these controls. If anything, the intergenerational 
transmission from the maternal grandparents is slightly stronger in this specifica-
tion. The  downward-sloping relationship is smoother and the total effect is margin-
ally larger.
In Figure A.IX in the online Appendix, we extend the specification to also allow 
the education dummies to have differential impacts before and after the arrival of 
children. This specification is very rich, but its interpretation is unclear. Specifically, 
in the previous section we argued that there has been secular trends from  pre-effects 
of children (anticipatory effects reflected in education choices) to  post-effects of 
children (child penalties). As a result, the education choices of the grandparents 
may well proxy for the child penalties in their generation. In this case, by interact-
ing the education choices of the grandparents with the  after-child dummy of the 
next generation, we are most likely absorbing some of the effect we are interested 
in. Consistent with this, online Appendix Figure A.IX shows that such controls do 
reduce the  intergenerational  correlations quite substantially. There is still an effect 
from the maternal grandparents (combined with a zero effect from the paternal 
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Figure 7. Intergenerational Transmission of Child Penalties with Controls
Notes: The figure shows the child penalty in earnings against quintiles of the relative labor supply distribution of 
the grandparents. The relative labor supply of grandparents is based on cumulated hours worked over the period 
 1964–1979 (obtained from ATP pension contributions). The child penalties are estimated using equation (5) and 
the statistic reported is  P q , as defined in Section VB. The panels allow for a set of  nonparametric controls for 
 within-generation wealth rank of the grandparents, grandparents region of residence, as well as the birth cohort of 
the grandparents. The shaded 95 percent confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors.
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grandparents), but the magnitude is only half as large as in the specifications con-
sidered above.
The transmission of child penalties between generations can occur through two 
channels: a transmission of fertility preferences or a transmission of penalties con-
ditional on fertility. That is, when women from “traditional” families incur larger 
child penalties, it may be because they have more children or it may be because 
they pay larger career costs for a given number of children. Figure A.X in the online 
Appendix explores this question by adding fertility dummies for the parents among 
the controls in equation (5). The figure shows that neutralizing the fertility chan-
nel has no impact on the results. This implies that the transmission of child pen-
alties does not occur through a transmission of fertility preferences, but through 
 family-career preferences for a given number of children.
To conclude, the child penalties on women are strongly correlated with the divi-
sion of labor in their own childhood homes, but not with the division of labor in their 
spouses’ childhood homes. That is, women who grew up in relatively traditional 
homes incur larger child penalties than women who grew up in relatively modern 
homes. The fact that these correlations survive the inclusion of rich  nonparametric 
controls for the main confounders (such as education and wealth) suggests that they 
do indeed reflect a transmission of labor supply behavior as opposed to a transmis-
sion of other correlated factors.21 Our findings are consistent with an influence of 
nurture in the formation of female preferences over children and career.
V. Conclusion
Despite considerable gender convergence over time, substantial gender inequal-
ity persists in all countries. Using  full-population administrative data from Denmark 
and a  quasi-experimental event study approach, we show that most of the remaining 
gender inequality can be attributed to the dynamic effects of children. We have pre-
sented three main sets of results.
First, we have shown that the impact of children on women is large and persistent 
across a wide range of labor market outcomes, while at the same time men are 
virtually unaffected. The female child penalty in earnings is close to 20 percent in 
the long run. Underlying this earnings penalty, we find sharp impacts of children 
on labor force participation, hours worked, wage rates, occupation, sector, and firm 
choices. Together, these findings provide a quite complete picture of the behavioral 
margins that adjust in response to parenthood and how strongly gendered these mar-
gins are.
Second, we have decomposed gender inequality into what can be attributed to 
children and what can be attributed to other factors. We have shown that the fraction 
of  child-related gender inequality has increased dramatically over time, from around 
40 percent in 1980 to around 80 percent in 2013. Therefore, to a first approximation, 
the remaining gender inequality is all about children. Our decomposition analysis 
21 Table A.I in the online Appendix provides further evidence on the robustness of these intergenerational cor-
relations to different controls for the characteristics of the grandparents and parents. The table summarizes the 
results from the specifications we have presented graphically, and it shows estimates from alternative specifications.
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represents a  reorientation of traditional gender gap decompositions: instead of study-
ing the extent to which men and women receive unequal pay for equal work (the 
unexplained gap after controlling for human capital and job characteristics, but not 
children), we study the extent to which they receive unequal pay as a result of chil-
dren (but not necessarily for equal work). The unexplained gap in traditional decom-
position analyses is often labeled “discrimination,” but our analysis highlights that 
the unexplained gap is largely due to children. This does not rule out discrimination, 
but implies that potential discrimination operates through the impacts of children.
Third, we have provided evidence in favor of environmental influences in the 
formation of preferences over family versus career. In particular, we have shown 
that the female child penalty is strongly related to the work history of the maternal 
grandparents: women who grow up in traditional families with a male breadwinner 
and a female homemaker incur larger child penalties when they themselves become 
mothers. At the same time, the female child penalty is unrelated to the work his-
tory of the paternal grandparents. Overall, these findings are consistent with the 
notion that child penalties are influenced by female gender identity formed during 
her childhood, as opposed to child penalties being driven by male gender identity 
formed during his childhood.
Our paper is agnostic about the potential welfare and policy implications of our 
findings. Although the term “child penalty” may have normative connotations, we 
do not draw any normative conclusions here. The previous gender literature focusing 
on the unexplained gender gap had a very natural normative benchmark: equal pay 
for equal jobs. Our paper highlights that unequal pay is due to children, which may 
be good or bad depending on the perspective. A traditional economic view would 
focus on comparative advantage in child rearing (due to innate gender differences 
in abilities or preferences for child care vs market work) along with gains from spe-
cialization, in which case our findings do not necessarily call for policy intervention. 
Another view is that the unequal effects of children are driven by environmental 
factors such as culture, social norms, or discrimination, producing potential inequi-
ties and inefficiencies. Our findings on intergenerational transmission are consistent 
with—but do not conclusively prove—the existence of such environmental factors. 
Future work should dig deeper into the underlying mechanisms and the implied 
welfare implications.
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